Estimating Prevalence of Entrapment in Post 9/11 Terrorism Cases

The sole purpose of the article gives an insight on how the terrorism cases have been carried out using entrapment tricks basing on the aftermath of 9/11. The article also challenges the counterterrorism policies which go after innocent individuals who did not have any means to commit a crime as unethical. For instance, Jesse and Grol-Prokopczyk finds Aaron's argument on most terrorism cases as valid; in fact, he concludes that only 1% of the cases constitute real prosecution, while 99% involves incidences of entrapment. However, the major audiences of this article are the authorities and other law enforcers, since it recommends redefining of counterterrorism policies. Similarly, it rejects the use of force on law-abiding Muslims as well as government prompting of individuals whose chances of committing a crime is zero. According to Jesse and Grol-Prokopczyk, entrapments by law enforcers lead to false prosecution and victimization of innocent individuals.

The arguments laid by Jesse and Grol-Prokopczyk supports article's main point. For instance, Jesse and Grol-Prokopczyk uses the case of James Cromitie to unravel how the court system overlooks the realism of entrapment while giving the verdict. In this example, Judge Colleen McMahon, working in a US district court gave 25years jail sentence despite having full knowledge and sufficient evidence that the government authorities entrapped the defendant (Norris & Grol-Prokopczyk, 2016). The judge view indicates that James Cromitie had no idea and means of plotting a bombing attack, a contradiction to his final ruling. Basing on the court decision, in this case, it is, therefore, justifiable that the FBI and other counterterrorism agencies prompt suspects into committing a crime to create a prosecution case.

Jesse and Grol-Prokopczyk also reveals solid evidence on the use of informants to induce defendants into confessions. The criticism of the role of witnesses supports the central theme of the article. In his findings, if the involvement of informants was absent then there could be no successful counterterrorism efforts by the government agency against Jihadists. For instance, 16 real threats were thwarted by the counterterrorism unit, preventing real attacks from happening. 9% of 31 defendants were jihadist defendants, but 5% of the jihadists' defendants' cases involved informants. Specifically, Ahmed Omar Abu Ali case that involved accusation on planning to bomb the United States pleaded guilty to lesser charges in court subject to previous torture by the Saudi Arabian interrogation unit (Norris & Grol-Prokopczyk, 2016). The entrapment concern comes in when informants are directly involved in back door coercion of defendants to plead guilty. Thus, informants contribute substantially in entrapment plots.

However, Jesse and Grol-Prokopczyk falls short to identify underlying issues in terrorism cases. Jesse and Grol-Prokopczyk uses indicator analysis method to determine whether a case may be under the influence of entrapment but the likelihood is not inevitable because of estimation. Unless the case has conspicuous extreme ends, then it 's hard to demonstrate government coercion of defendants to plead guilty. For example, the case of Michael C. Reynold's case, the score indicator outcome was two out of six, giving it a dismal chance to conclude signs of entrapment. Jesse and Grol-Prokopczyk forced to use Reynold's background information to make a confident conclusion. Upon the findings from the online chatroom, Reynold was unemployed and lived with parents who had a history of the mental problem. Jesseand Grol-Prokopczyk had no otherwise, but to clinch to this observation that Reynold could not have been in a position to commit a crime unless he had an accomplice (Norris & Grol-Prokopczyk, 2016). Therefore, a shortfall of the indicator analysis that it does not dig deeper into underlying issues of a particular case but rather overlooks the credibility of the available evidence that might give prove beyond reasonable doubt.

I concur with the arguments laid by Jesse and Grol-Prokopczyk on entrapment plots. In fact, directing counterterrorism attacks towards Muslims is a sign of staged plots rather than guided efforts to eliminate terrorism threats. The scope of unraveling the right wing terrorism should be wider beyond isolation and discrimination of Muslims. It is also factual that government intervention in Terrorism cases by use of informants leads to entrapment; however, threats posed by right wing terrorists are realistic since assailants themselves plan them. More so, passive surveillance is fruitful in determining the primary potential threats at an early stage hence easy to combat the act before it happens. However, I agree with Jesse and Grol-Prokopczyk, that it is a waste of resources when counterterrorism agencies constantly instigate terrorism plots. Therefore, recommending a cut on funding such sector to avoid staged terrorist attacks. Additionally, the court system should adapt to Judge Richards Posner's view of entrapment. In Hollingsworth's defense, the judge suggests that the subjective standard should apply to determine the individual's likelihood of committing a crime on practical grounds. If the defendant lacks the means to commit a crime then he or she should be acquitted from the judges or in the event of government abuse of entrapment doctrine, one should be freed from terrorism allegations.

Conclusion

Most studies on entrapment base their arguments on few cases that cannot provide elaborate emerging issues about entrapment. The author's estimation of prevalence of entrapment in terrorist cases evaluates the merits of current counterterrorism policies as well as suggests the best reforms to implement the new policies and make them operational. Moreover, government control of crimes through the use of informant agents can lead to sting operations, since the scene of the offense is organized together with the players. Consequently, giving a false signal on the functionality of the policies set to counter terrorism. Therefore, the informant led terrorism cases leads to unfair court hearing hence injustice in terrorism cases.

References

Norris, J. J., & Grol-Prokopczyk , H. (2016). Estimating the Prevalence of Entrapment in Post-9/11 Terrorism Cases.